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This article analyses the salience of and governmental positions on differentiated integration (DI) in 
Portugal in the 2004-2020 period. Employing quantitative and qualitative analyses, it first examines 
the salience and position of the successive Portuguese governments towards DI using documents such 
as government programmes, Prime-Ministerial speeches, parliamentary debates, and statements by 
the Prime Minister in European Council meetings. The results from the salience analysis demonstrate 
a low saliency of DI. Salience was enhanced by an increasing intersection between domestic and 
European politics during the euro crisis period, politicising the debate especially around DI instances 
of an economic nature. The position of Portuguese governments regarding DI during the period 
analysed was overwhelmingly negative. A wide consensus stood out among Portuguese political 
parties that DI models clearly go against both the European – by risking a disaggregation of the EU 
– and the national interest – by possibly pushing Portugal into an even more peripheral position.   
Keywords: differentiated integration; Portugal; government  
Introduction 
Despite the increasing recent research on differentiated integration (Holzinger and 
Schimmelfennig 2012; Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2020), extant studies have not yet 
shed light on how the governments of the different EU Member States think about 
differentiated integration. This article aims to make a contribution in that direction by 
providing a general outlook on the Portuguese government’s views on multiple 
dimensions of differentiated integration in the period ranging from 2004 to 2020. It 
investigates how salient differentiated integration is in Portugal, and what positions 
Portuguese governments took on differentiated integration.   
While European integration has typically been little politicised in Portugal (e.g. Freire 
and Santana-Pereira, 2015; Jalali and Silva, 2011), the timeframe of analysis, covering 
several important milestones in the process of European integration, may have 
constituted an opportunity for further politicisation of the topic. Moreover, the euro 
crisis may have created a favourable context for parties to politicise DI (Kriesi and 
 
1 The research leading to this report was conducted within the InDivEU project. The project has received funding 
from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 
822304. The funders had no role in the study design, data collection or analysis. 
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Grande 2016). Although media content analyses of this period show little salience of 
EU integration issues in Portugal (Silva and Mendes 2019), studies present some 
evidence of politicisation in the 2011 election (Hutter and Kriesi 2019). 
To help frame the Portuguese political context during this period, Table 1 presents 
some contextual information on the prime ministers and the political parties in 
government in different periods of the analytical timeframe.  
Table 1 List of Portuguese governments and prime ministers, 2004-2020  
Prime Minister’s 
name  
Political party  Government(s)  Period  
José  Manuel  Durão  
Barroso  
Social Democratic Party 
(Partido Social 
Democrata)  
XV  (coalition 




Pedro Santana Lopes  Social Democratic Party 
(Partido Social 
Democrata)  
XVI  (coalition 
 with CDS-PP)  
17.07.2004- 
12.03.2005  
José Sócrates  Socialist  Party  (Partido  
Socialista)  
XVII; XVIII  12.03.2005
- 
21.06.2011  
Pedro Passos Coelho  Social Democratic Party 
(Partido Social 
Democrata)  
XIX  (coalition 
 with CDS-
PP); XX  (pre-
electoral coalition 
with CDS-PP)2  
21.07.2011- 
26.11.2015  
António Costa  Socialist  Party  (Partido  
Socialista)  
XXI (parliamentary 
agreement with PCP, 
PEV, and BE)2; XXII  
26.11.2015-
present  
Theory and methods  
The theoretical framework laid out in the introduction to the present special issue 
conceptualises differentiated integration in terms of policy (referring to different 
degrees of participation in EU policies stemming from divergent MS integration 
preferences/capacities), polity (an outcome of policy differentiation and a product of 
MS preferences regarding the nature of the European Union as a polity), and 
mechanisms (the means to achieve MS demands for more/less integration). These 
three dimensions guide the present analysis of the Portuguese case. 
For that purpose, this article examines the salience and position of differentiated 
integration (DI) in Portugal in the period 2004-2020. Employing a quantitative and a 
qualitative analysis, it first examines the salience of DI models and mechanisms for the 
successive Portuguese governments using documents such as government 
programmes, Prime-Ministerial speeches, parliamentary debates, and statements by 
 
2 The XX government was formed and presented a government programme, but this programme was rejected in 
parliament leading to the fall of the government and the subsequent constitution of the XXI government. 
2 Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Português), Ecologist Party – The Greens (Partido Ecologista 




the Prime Minister in European Council meetings (Telle et al. 2021). Secondly, it 
reviews governments’ general positions on DI, while zooming in on four peaks of 
salience: the Lisbon Treaty, the debate on the Unitary Patent, the financial crisis and 
the discussions on the Financial Transaction Tax and the Fiscal Compact, and the 
White Paper on the Future of Europe.  
The salience of policy DI, polity DI, and DI mechanism was assessed by counting key 
words in the above-mentioned documents (Appendix 2). To determine government 
positions, references to DI key words in parliamentary debates were manually coded 
as negative, neutral or positive. The following sections show the results of this analysis 
in terms of polity DI, policy DI, and DI mechanisms.  
Polity differentiation  
Salience  
To determine how much polity differentiation is discussed by the Portuguese 
government (and opposition parties), the analytical focus was placed on a manual 
count of key DI words in these documents. A word count analysis of eight Portuguese 
government programmes (XV to XXII Constitutional Government) covering the period 
from 2002 to 2019 using computer-assisted software revealed no references to key 
words relative to polity DI. To complement the quantitative word count analysis, a 
qualitative analysis of the government programmes was carried out. This examination 
revealed almost constant yet very tenuously salient references to DI in government 
programmes. Such references occurred in passages within broader sections on foreign 
policy instead of specific sections devoted to the role of Portugal in the EU. While very 
rarely directly mentioning specific models, instruments or instances of DI, the majority 
of these government programmes highlighted the importance of deepening European 
integration and the challenges that may arise in this process. Among the first four 
government programmes analysed (2002-2009), these issues tended to be mentioned 
under the umbrella topic of the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty. 
A subsequent set of analyses of multiple types of prime ministerial speeches confirmed 
these previous indications. The first speeches by the new prime ministers following 
each election were analysed to measure the extent to which DI emerged as a salient 
domestic political issue. The word count analysis revealed no use of DI key words and 
very limited references to EU-related issues. An analysis of the Prime Minister’s speech 
in the national and European Parliaments on taking the presidency of the Council of 
the European Union again did not show use of key DI words. EU-related issues were, 
nonetheless, mentioned with some regularity. Furthermore, the presence of DI key 
words in the subsequent national and European parliament debates was analysed. 
Again, the results showed virtually no use of DI key words in the parliamentary 
debates, be they in the national or European arena (a single mention of ‘two-speed 
Europe’ in the EP debate was found).  
In light of these findings, the governments’ positions were predominantly analysed 
based on a manual attitude analysis of parliamentary debates between 2004-20203. 
Figure 2 plots the frequency of key words related to DI models made in the Portuguese 
Parliament over the 16-year period of the analysis. As can be seen, the overall frequency 
 
3 The end date was set at 01-03-2020.  
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of these conceptual key words was low in Portuguese parliamentary debates (N=363). 
The years of 2011 and 2012 come out as the peak-salience years, overlapping with the 
euro crisis period (2010-2012). Also, in 2017, in the context of the debates on the 
Future of Europe, there is a noticeable peak in reference to these key words. 
Figure 1 Breakdown of references to DI models in parliamentary debates, 2004-2020  
 
Out of the four key words identified, there is significant variation with respect to their 
frequency of use: ‘core Europe,’ measured using the key word ‘directorate’4, constitutes 
the great majority of the references to DI key words (84%), while the other key words 
have a residual weight in parliamentary debates. Moreover, there is a strong 
concentration around key words referring to different end points, as only 9% of the 
references concern multiple speeds. However, this imbalance seems to attenuate over 
time, as in 2017 ‘directorate’ accounts for less than two thirds of all the key words, with 
a visible growth in references to key words associated with different speeds. 
Position  
The government’s position on DI models is unequivocally negative (Tables 2 and 3). 
Remarkably, in the 134 references analysed, polity differentiation keywords were never 
referred to in a positive manner, either by the government or the opposition. 
Consequently, there were no significant differences between these two types of actors 
in this regard. However, opposition parties appear to have referred much more 
frequently to multi-speed Europe, with a strong concentration in the period 2017-2020 
which can be attributed to the informal meeting held at Versailles in March 2017 
between the leaders of France, Germany, Italy, and Spain pushing for a multi-speed 
Europe, and to the parliamentary debate held on the occasion of the celebration of the 
60-year anniversary of the Treaty of Rome. 
 
4 The qualitative analysis showed that parliamentarians often used the term ‘directorate’ to refer to a core group of 
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The disparity between government and opposition parties is even clearer regarding the 
key words pertaining to multi-end Europe. The opposition was about seven times more 
likely to use these key words than the government in the period analysed. Among key 
words relating to multi-end Europe, it is also worth noting that ‘core Europe’ 
(directorate) appears much more frequently than variable geometry. The key word 
‘directorate’ is used in the Portuguese political context with an inherently pejorative 
tone, as it conveys the notion that a given group of powerful countries hold 
disproportionate decision-making power over the EU, often forcing their will on 
smaller countries such as Portugal, at the cost of their national interests. Therefore, 
attention should be drawn less to the fact that the references are, unsurprisingly, 
mostly negative, than to perhaps the most noteworthy aspect – the imbalance between 
the opposition and government parties in the frequency of use of this key word. The 
reasons for this discrepancy stand out in the qualitative analysis below.  
Table 2 Position on multi-speed Europe (two-speed + multi-speed)  
(n = 23)  Negative  Neutral  Positive  
Government   5  1  0  
Opposition   20  3  0  
Table 3 Position on multi-end Europe (variable geometry + core Europe/directorate)  
(n = 111)  Negative  Neutral  Positive  
Government   12  5  0  
Opposition  82  12  0  
There is a single direct reference to multiple speed key words by the Portuguese Prime 
Minister in the context of the parliamentary debate and vote approving the Lisbon 
Treaty in the Portuguese parliament. The Treaty was approved in parliament with a 
consensus among the mainstream parties that it represented the only way forward in 
terms of European integration and was a necessary tool to avoid undesirable models 
of differentiated integration, as was exemplified in the Prime Minister’s address:  
“The Lisbon Treaty was concluded and ratified during the Portuguese 
Presidency. This was one of the main goals of our presidency and it was fully 
achieved. We should be proud of it. Just think of what we would be debating 
here today should there be no Treaty. We would certainly be debating topics 
such as the European crisis, the European standoff or multi-speed Europe. The 
truth is that we are here today approving the new Lisbon Treaty and not a 
European crisis.” (Prime Minister José Socrates (Partido Socialista), 
Parliament, 24.04.2008). 
In an intervention during the debate on the white paper on the Future of Europe, it 
becomes clear that the Portuguese government considered that the EU had not been 
moving at a single speed and towards the same end point – regrettably – but that the 
Future of Europe and the advancement of the process of European integration should 
not be slowed down by countries that were reluctant to move forward. In those 
instances, DI may be a useful instrument to solve political deadlocks, problematic as it 
may be.  
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“The EU’s problem is not of speed but of direction. We have lived with different 
speeds for a long time, that of the countries belonging to the eurozone and that 
of the countries belonging to Schengen, to name the most significant ones. 
Regarding the scenarios proposed by the President of the European 
Commission, it should be clear that no Member State will be excluded from an 
enhanced co-operation if it is in the condition to join and that is its political 
will” (MP Edite Estrela (Partido Socialista), Parliament, 29.03.2017).  
Although government references to multi-end models are more frequent, they too are 
relatively scarce in this period. In the few instances in which the key word ‘directorate’ 
was used by the government, it was either to assert the inexistence of a directorate or 
to ensure such a directorate never materialised. The following quotation from a debate 
on Reports on the Participation of Portugal in the Process of European Construction is 
exemplary: 
“But I must be quite frank in answering a question posed in this debate by saying 
that Portugal will never accept that the European Union becomes governed by 
a directorate. We have always said it and we will continue to say so: we shall 
not allow it. The Union is a creation of all, and shall be governed by all to the 
satisfaction of goals shared by all. We will only work on these grounds, nothing 
else” (Deputy Secretary of State for European Affairs Manuel Lobo Antunes 
(Partido Socialista), parliament, 25.05.2007).  
The salience of this key word increased with the debates on the Lisbon Treaty, given 
concerns that the Treaty could accentuate regional differences and the peripheral 
character of Portugal. However, the government refrained from using it often, as 
compared to the opposition. Nevertheless, answering the opposition’s concerns, the 
Prime Minister argued that the Treaty was the appropriate instrument to avoid such a 
directorate:  
“Only with a stronger and more agile institutional architecture can Europe fulfil 
its responsibilities to European citizens, the European economy, and also the 
rest of the world. Unlike what some say, this is the way to fight the logic of a 
small directorate of major countries over the remaining ones” (Prime Minister 
José Sócrates (Partido Socialista), Parliament, 24.04.2008).  
The Socialist Prime Minister António Costa’s intervention during the parliamentary 
debate on the white paper on the Future of Europe effectively summarised the 
longstanding consensus among the mainstream parties about the Portuguese position 
on European integration, and DI in particular: advocating for further European 
integration at one speed and towards a common end point, Portuguese governments 
tended to be resistant to DI until they envisioned no other way of advancing with the 
integration process, at which point they embraced it as inevitable. When it came to 
choosing between halting integration but remaining united as one, or moving forward 
through DI with those on board, Portuguese governments tended to stand for the 
latter. In this sense, variable geometry, understood mainly as deriving from more 
enhanced cooperation under the third scenario, was perceived as a lesser evil 
compared to more regressive scenarios emanating from the white paper.  
“I would like to be clear, repeating what I have said previously: variable 
geometry may be a lesser evil, but it is always a risk. And it is a lesser evil 




less coherent that geometry is, and the more some states aggregate around the 
euro, others around security and defence, others on other domains. But I cannot 
ignore that there are today states that not only do not want to go further, but 
they even want to regress, and either we stand in a complete blockade or we 
open a door to advance. I would obviously prefer a door through which we all 
could advance. If that is impossible, I think that those who are willing should be 
allowed to go further. What I have said (…) is that Portugal’s strategy has been 
to stand among the frontrunners, to always be among what can be called the 
core, the forefront for advance and progress in the EU” (Prime Minister António 
Costa (Partido Socialista), parliament, 08.03.2017).  
This ambiguous stance on variable geometry was reinforced in statements by MPs from 
the Socialist Party on multiple occasions, also mentioning other key DI words:  
“It is not impossible to have variable geometries with whoever wants to go 
further in certain areas, as already happens with the euro, Schengen, security 
and defence policy or, in the future, with the European Public Prosecutor. 
However, as the Prime Minister highlighted, these variable geometries 
cannot be the rule and cannot obey a simple logic of a directorate or exclusion 
of Member States just because they are medium of small-sized, or peripheral, or 
have certain problems” (MP Vitalino Canas (Partido Socialista), parliament, 
08.03.2017).  
Contrary to the government’s predominantly neutral references to multi-speed and 
multi-end Europe, the opposition tended to express much more frequent and more 
negative views in the debates on the Future of Europe. This also applied to the Social 
Democratic Party, which tended to be very much aligned with the Socialist Party on 
European affairs:  
“I still remember the time when the greatest threat to the future of the EU was 
said to be the creation of a directorate, an informal directorate. As the Prime 
Minister mentioned, the white paper, and mostly the meeting that took place 
this week between the heads of state and heads of government – Italians, 
French, German and Spanish, from our standpoint, from Portugal, suggests that 
what happened in Versailles, if it is not the creation of a directorate it is 
certainly something very similar. And, ironically, as the Prime Minister is so 
busy meeting with the countries from the south, behold, the three greatest 
countries from the south ran to join Germany to form this directorate. And 
what did this directorate say this week? It said that Europe needs to move at 
different speeds. It is very important to understand what this means. I admit 
that such indefiniteness has even affected the government. Even yesterday, the 
Minister of Finances said that Portugal rejected the idea of a multi-speed 
Europe, and not minutes later, the Prime Minister made a contrary statement, 
saying that Portugal, after all, did not fear a multi-speed Europe and even 
wanted to join the forefront of such a project. This indefiniteness must be put to 
an end, for a simple reason: a two-speed Europe, or a multi-speed Europe, 
already exists. It exists among the EMU countries and those that did not join; 
among those belonging to the Schengen area and those which do not; among 
those that have opt-outs and those which do not. Therefore, we need to know 
what new aspects this carries. Is it an appeal to an intensification of the 
enhanced co-operation mechanism? Well, there are initiatives in the context 
da Silva, ANZJES 13(3) 
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of enhanced co-operation such as, for example, the Financial Transaction 
Tax, which has already been under way for a few years and, apparently, came to 
a halt. Should we assume that this multi-speed Europe happens within the 
eurozone? That would not only be an undesirable development but also a 
dangerous one, because it would lead to fragmentation and not greater unity in 
Europe. In fact, that would be the true Europe à la carte, and that has been 
the headline used by some of the press, especially French, in the aftermath of 




In general terms, policy differentiation is the most discussed dimension by both the 
Portuguese government and the opposition parties, although very rarely mentioned in 
government programmes (twelve mentions of a total of three internal DI key phrases: 
Schengen; Economic and Monetary Union; area of freedom, security and justice; and 
three mentions of a total of two external DI key words: European Stability Mechanism 
and European Economic Area). An important element of policy differentiation are 
inter se agreements – international agreements allowing Member States to circumvent 
the institutional constraints of the community method. In the analysis were included 
the Prüm convention, the European Stability Mechanism, the Fiscal Compact, the 
Single Resolution Mechanism, and the Unified Patent Court. A longitudinal analysis of 
the aggregated key words in parliamentary debates suggests that they became salient 
in Portuguese parliamentary debates in 2012 and remained highly salient until 2016 
(Figure 2).  
Figure 2 Breakdown of inter se agreements into DI instances 2004-2020  
 
The signing of the Fiscal Compact in 2012, the entry into force of the Single Resolution 
Mechanism and the establishment of the European Stability Mechanism, together with 
the subsequent debates in the Portuguese Parliament, are largely in line with the 
salience peaks. This time trend is also contemporary with the most severe period of the 
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Programme. Therefore, the impact of the euro crisis seems to go hand in hand with the 
salience and politicisation of inter se agreements. This becomes all the more evident 
when looking at the most frequently used key words: nearly two-thirds of all the 
references relate to the Fiscal Compact (62%), and a fifth to the European Stability 
Mechanism (21%). Together with the Single Resolution Mechanism (9%), these inter-
Member State economic agreements amount to over 90% of all the references. It can 
therefore be concluded that the salience and politicisation of inter se agreements – and 
more generally policy differentiation – were tightly related to the euro crisis and its 
consequences in public debate in Portugal.  
As for instances of enhanced cooperation, the analysis considered PESCO, Rome III, 
Unitary Patent, Matrimonial Property Regimes, Financial Transaction Tax, and the 
European Public Prosecutor. Figure 3 depicts references to these instances in a 
longitudinal fashion. A clear peak is notable in 2017-2018, dominated by debates on 
PESCO. The Unitary Patent was also particularly salient in 2011, as the Financial 
Transaction Tax in 2012. These indications were confirmed once we broke down the 
data by the different DI instances: about 65% of the references concentrated on PESCO 
and 20% on the Financial Transaction Tax, which was particularly discussed 
domestically during the economic crisis period.  
Figure 3 Breakdown of DI instances of enhanced cooperation, 2004-2020  
 
Position  
The euro crisis hit the Portuguese economy severely, leading to the 2011 bailout 
request. In 2012, in the midst of the Economic Adjustment Programme there was a 
lively debate focused mostly on the economic dimensions of European integration. 
Unsurprisingly, the references to DI key words related to the Financial Transaction Tax 
and, to a greater extent, the dimensions of the Fiscal Compact were prevalent.  
The Prime Minister made one direct reference to the Financial Transaction Tax as 
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“Yes, Mr. MP, from the start the Financial Transaction Tax deserved 
approval by the Portuguese government – and that was explicit in a letter signed 
by the Minister of State and Finances himself. Portugal has been favourable to 
the introduction of such a ‘Tobin tax’ in the European area, considering that the 
eurozone is the unequivocal area to implement such a tax. However, as you 
know, several Member States have expressed a desire to proceed in this matter. 
That is the case of France, which has already introduced the second amendment 
to the mechanism which was adopted in August of this year; of Spain, which has 
already expressed its intentions; and of Portugal, which expressed interest in 
the same direction and which, as a matter of fact, has joined this enhanced co-
operation mechanism, at least within the eurozone, but also with other 
countries which, although they do not belong to the eurozone, want to be part 
of this enhanced co-operation effort, to implement this tax on financial 
transactions which, somehow, implies the possibility of the whole eurozone 
maximising its contribution against the challenges to funding and growth in 
Europe” (Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho (Partido Social Democrata), 
parliament, 13.10.2012).  
However, the core of debates on DI during this period concerned the Fiscal Compact. 
The centre-right coalition government formed by the Social Democratic Party and its 
junior coalition partner, the CDS – People’s Party, was a strong advocate of the Fiscal 
Compact. This government was responsible for the implementation of the bulk of the 
Economic Adjustment Programme’s austerity measures and perceived the Fiscal 
Compact as an important mechanism not only to further European integration but also 
to avoid in the future the economic pitfalls that led to the Portuguese bailout and the 
euro crisis in general. Hence, there was a clear intersection between European and 
domestic agendas on this topic. 
“The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance introduces, on the one 
hand, the implementation of more effective mechanisms to guarantee the 
fulfilment of the goals so often exalted by Portugal and its partners and, on the 
other hand, the transposition into the internal legislation of each Member State 
of the obligation to uphold a balanced budget. (…) The solution adopted in this 
treaty is therefore more coherent with our understanding of an autonomous 
political community, able and responsible for defining its own objectives and 
defending them in its choices. (…) In this sense, the treaty makes an important 
contribution to enhance the democratic character of our societies and the great 
European society. This treaty, in the end, represents our refusal to repeat the 
mistakes of the past. And I am not referring only to the mistakes made by several 
European countries in the last two decades. I am referring also to the mistakes 
which we allowed being committed in Portugal in our democratic history. We 
must not forget that in less than 35 years we have had to ask for external 
financial support three times. In this sense, the treaty is even more pertinent for 
the protection of countries such as Portugal than for other European partners 
which are, perhaps, more mature and with more longstanding reputations of 
financial responsibility” (Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho (Partido Social 
Democrata), parliament, 13.04.2012).  
Although the Socialist Party, in opposition, voted in favour of the Fiscal Compact, the 
party presented a motion recommending that the government should propose and 




agenda of growth and employment creation, considering that Portugal was “too hasty 
in ratifying the Fiscal Compact” and that the government “should have fought for an 
additional title which would be fundamental to enable European growth and 
unemployment policies.” On the occasion of this debate, the Socialists’ parliamentary 
group leader made several critical references to DI but actively distinguished between 
enhanced co-operation and a two-speed Europe:  
“The Lisbon Treaty comprises an inter-governmental vision of the EU. This 
inter-governmental perspective derives from the assumption that countries, 
when they are allowed to work in an intergovernment solution, would structure 
in enhanced co-operation. And, as happened with the euro and Schengen, 
would take other interesting measures of variable geometry, not a two-
speed Europe but a variable geometry Europe. What have we realised? We 
have realised that a variable geometry Europe has rapidly transformed into 
a two-speed Europe, with a Franco-German directorate and a set of other 
countries which, de facto, do not participate in European decision-making (…). 
But at the same time, we are in favour of transferring competences, not to the 
directorate but to the European Commission” (MP Carlos Zorrinho (Partido 
Socialista), parliament, 24.05.2012).  
Regarding PESCO, most references to it were made by the opposition parties. Still, the 
Prime Minister addressed this policy differentiation mechanism in a parliamentary 
debate preceding the European Council meeting of September 2017, presenting it as 
yet another necessary step in deepening the European integration process:  
“Regarding security and defence, it is fundamental to guarantee the deepening 
of European collaboration in the security and defence areas as yet another factor 
of cohesion in the Union, able to strengthen its ability to provide a combined, 
structured response to the multiple external challenges facing the Union. (…). 
This Permanent Structured Cooperation, which we are analysing, should 
constitute a challenge of deepening the European project, but should also, as we 
have been arguing, rely on solid grounds and solid grounds only exist by 
completing and consolidating the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the 
greatest challenge ever fulfilled by the European Union and whose conclusion 
we must ensure” (Prime Minister António Costa (Partido Socialista), 
parliament, 13.09.2017). 
Mechanisms of differentiation  
Salience  
Regarding mechanisms of differentiated integration, the analysis focused specifically 
on the concepts of ‘enhanced co-operation’ and ‘opt-out.’ 5  No references to 
mechanisms of differentiation were found in government programmes during the 
period of analysis. Figure 3 displays the distribution of mentions of the two concepts 
in parliamentary debates over time, counting 238 references over the period of 
 
5 There is not a specific term to designate the possibility to ‘opt-out’ in Portuguese. Instead, this is usually referred 
to using a number of possible composite expressions which widely depend on the context and so cannot be 
captured with a key word search. The original English terminology is also seldomly used. With the lack of a better 
alternative, this was the key word adopted.  
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analysis. There are substantial differences across the timeframe, with a clearly defined 
peak in 2011.  
Breaking down the word count into the two DI mechanisms analysed, it becomes 
evident that debates on DI mechanisms focused substantially more on ways to advance 
integration rather than to halt it – an expected finding given Portugal’s historical 
stance as a champion of European integration. 86 percent of the references to DI 
mechanisms concern discussions on enhanced co-operation. Furthermore, the 2011 
peak corresponds exclusively to references to enhanced co-operation. This year 
coincides with the discussions on the Unitary Patent, which brought the topic of 
enhanced cooperation to parliamentary debates quite frequently, as confirmed by a 
qualitative content analysis. The 2017 peak, situated in the context of the Future of 
Europe debates, reflects the same distribution as the wider 16-year-long sample.  
Figure 4 The salience of DI mechanisms in parliamentary debates  
 
Position  
Despite the relatively high salience of mechanisms of differentiation in parliamentary 
debates, both concepts were significantly more frequently mentioned by the opposition 
than by the government. Enhanced co-operation was generally discussed in positive 
terms, particularly by the government, with a relatively homogenous distribution but 
still a noticeable peak in 2012, mostly explained by the previously analysed discussion 
on the Fiscal Compact involving multiple parties. Among the opposition parties, there 
is more ambiguity. There is a marked peak of negative references in 2011 related to the 
perceived undue use of enhanced co-operation over the Unitary Patent. However, as 
will become evident from the qualitative analysis, these negative references had to do 
with procedural aspects and very specific issues, and not with the nature of the 
instrument of enhanced co-operation itself. The remaining references by opposition 
parties can be divided into positive and neutral ones, the latter being concentrated 
between 2017-2020. Opt-outs are virtually not discussed in parliamentary debates 





Table 4 Position on enhanced co-operation  
(n = 25)  Negative  Neutral  Positive  
Government (n = 7)  0  2  5  
Opposition (n = 18)  14  1  3  
Table 5 Position on opt-outs  
(n = 1)  Negative  Neutral  Positive  
Government (n = 0)  0  0  0  
Opposition (n = 1)  0  1  0  
While policy DI was generally perceived negatively by both the government and the 
opposition, DI mechanisms seem to be more positively considered by both types of 
political actors. However, references to opt-outs were nearly inexistent and most 
discussion was on the enhanced co-operation mechanism. The debate on the Unitary 
Patent made clear how mainstream parties, be they in government or the opposition, 
perceive enhanced co-operation positively, yet as a mechanism to be used only in 
exceptional cases:  
“To conclude, Mr. President, I would like to say the following: this Parliament 
and the Socialist Party’s parliamentary group are not insensitive to the strategic 
importance of the language or to the indispensability of enhanced co-
operation processes being conducted in accordance with the procedures 
foreseen by the Treaty, but the report emanated by the European Affairs 
Committee summarising the arguments in other committees’ reports, 
safeguards the exceptionality of the procedure and the importance of 
guaranteeing in other domains equal dignity of all the languages.” (MP Maria 
de Belém Roseira (Partido Socialista), parliament, 04.03.2020).  
Discussion and conclusion   
The results demonstrate a low saliency of differentiated integration (DI) and, more 
generally, European integration in Portugal between 2004 and 2020. DI models were 
more salient than DI mechanisms, but this is mostly due to the high number of 
references to the ‘directorate’ by the opposition parties. DI instances are the most 
salient. Of the several documents analysed, DI was most salient in parliamentary 
debates (although only in key moments) and pre-European Council addresses by prime 
ministers. DI was rarely mentioned in government programmes. Peaks in salience can 
be linked to key milestones in wider debates on European integration, such as the 
Lisbon Treaty, the Unitary Patent, the Fiscal Compact and especially the white paper 
on the Future of Europe. Salience was also enhanced by an increasing intersection 
between domestic and European politics during the euro crisis period, politicising the 
debate especially around DI instances of an economic nature.  
The position of Portuguese governments regarding DI during the period analysed was 
overwhelmingly negative. In general, this stance was also shared by the opposition 
parties, despite them having strong disagreements on European integration: for pro-
EU parties, DI was mostly perceived as a threat to the unity and cohesion of the 
da Silva, ANZJES 13(3) 
 
52 
European Union; for Eurosceptics, it was identified as a source of imbalances across 
the Member States and one of the most important drivers of inequalities within the 
EU, with strong negative consequences for Portugal’s national interest.  
There is a wide consensus among Portuguese political parties that DI models clearly 
go against both the European – by risking a disaggregation of the EU – and the national 
interest – by possibly pushing Portugal into an even more peripheral position. Actors 
were extremely critical of models entailing different speeds and different end points, 
although they were generally neutral when referring to variable geometry. Underlying 
the governments’ positions on DI was a more or less explicit concern that Portugal 
could be left behind or even excluded from the core in a DI scenario. Hence, when there 
was a likelihood of impending DI, Portuguese governments repeatedly reiterated their 
intention to place Portugal at the forefront of European integration. This accounts for 
most of the non-negative references encountered. Notwithstanding this generally 
negative view of DI, mainstream parties – which alternated in government during the 
timeframe of the analysis – viewed the enhanced co-operation mechanism in a 
generally positive manner, recognising its potential to promote advances in European 
integration when the EU faced critical deadlocks.   
Regarding polity DI, parties made most references to the ‘directorate’ key word. 
However, there are important nuances as to how the different actors employed this 
term. Opposition parties tended to use it more frequently to confront the government 
with the need to stand up for the national interests of peripheral countries such as 
Portugal against the will of the most powerful countries. These parties often used DI to 
justify their Eurosceptic stances by drawing attention to the power disparities within 
the EU which relegate Portugal to a secondary and submissive role. On the contrary, 
the government, irrespective of which party is in office at a given point, tended to be 
much more contained in the use of this key word (even if it used it frequently when in 
opposition). Cross-pressured between the national interest and the constraints of EU 
politics, successive governments tended to adopt a more pragmatic and diplomatic 
approach, refraining from using this negatively charged word as it implied 
acknowledgement of a de facto bias in EU-level decision-making. Nevertheless, all the 
parties agreed that a more or less formal ‘directorate’ in the European Union was 
something to avoid, together with models entailing multiple speeds, although they 
recognised that to a certain extent they were already in place (see for example the 
debate on the Future of Europe). The mainstream parties (the Socialist Party, the 
Social Democratic Party and the CDS – People’s Party) saw in the Lisbon Treaty an 
important tool to prevent the development and institutionalisation of DI models. 
Inversely, the remaining parties claimed that the Lisbon Treaty would further enable a 
model of a core Europe in which the most powerful country would be able to control 
the fate of the EU.  
Future research could expand the timeframe of analysis to consider the potential 
impacts of the COVID-19 crisis and the European Recovery and Resilience Plan (given 
that Portugal is the second largest beneficiary compared to national GDP) on both the 
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